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ii. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure because the sentencing of Ms. Dimauro, on September 18, 
1997, is considered the final decision of the District Court. See also Utah Code Sec. 
78-2a-3 (2)(f). 
The Notice of Appeal was filed on October 15, 1997, within 30 days of the entry 
of judgment. Thus, pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this 
appeal is timely. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for appeal are as follows: 
1. Is the State barred from filing a new action after dismissal of 
the first Information after Preliminary Hearing? 
Standard of Review: Reviewed on due process considerations. 
Reviewed for correctness. State v. Brickey. 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986). 
2. Did the trial court err in failing to exclude the tape recording which was 
not disclosed to Defendant by the prosecution? 
Standard of Review: The Court reviews the trial court's admission of 
evidence for correctness. State v. Kalliiy 877 P.2d 138 (Utah 1994). 
TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, provides that: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
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due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
The Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7, provides that: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
Rule 16(a) of the Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure provides that: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall 
disclose to the defense upon request the following material 
or information of which he has knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of 
the defendant or codefendants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant 
or codefendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that 
tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate 
the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of 
the offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court 
determines on good cause shown should be made available 
to the defendant in order for the defendant to adequately 
prepare his defense. 
Rule 16(b) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that: 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as 
practicable following the filing of charges and before the 
defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor has a 
continuing duty to make disclosure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Ms. Dimauro appeals from her conviction following a Jury Trial of Unlawful Use 
of a Credit card, in violation of Utah Code Sec. 76-6-506.2. 
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B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
1. On January 31, 1997, Ms. Dimauro was charged in a two-count 
Information with Unlawful Use of a Credit Card, a third-degree Felony and a Class B 
Misdemeanor , in violation of a Utah Code Sec. 76-6-506.2. 
2. On May 13, 1997, a Preliminary Hearing was held and the case was 
dismissed on the basis that the language contained in the original Information claimed Ms. 
Dimauro had "signed the name of another" on credit card receipts when she had 
in fact signed her own name. 
3. On May 13, 1997, the San Juan County Attorney filed an amended 
Information under a new case number with the same charges but deleted the 
language that Ms. Dimauro had "signed the name of another." The language in the 
Information was changed to read "did knowingly purchase or attempt to purchase goods 
or services by use of a financial transaction credit number not authorized by the issuer 
or cardholder 
4. On May 29, 1997, a Preliminary Hearing on the refiled case was held 
and Ms. Dimauro was bound over for trial on the counts charged in the amended 
Information of May 13, 1997. 
5. On July 15, 1997, a jury was impaneled and on that same day, the jury 
returned a guilty verdict. 
C. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
The sentencing hearing was held on September 18, 1997. At that time, the trial 
court ordered Ms. Dimauro committed to the Utah State Prison for a term not to exceed 
five (5) years. The Findings, Judgment and Commitment was entered on September 19, 
1997. 
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A Notice of Appeal was filed on October 15, 1997. 
D. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 31, 1997, Ms. Dimauro was charged in a two-count Information with 
Unlawful Use of a Credit Card, a third-degree felony and a class B misdemeanor, the value 
of the use distinguishing the degrees. (R 12-13) Both counts charged that "Defendant did 
with intent to defraud sign the name of another to a financial transaction card..." 
Preliminary Hearing was held on May 13, 1997. The Magistrate dismissed based on the 
above language. Ms. Dimauro had, in fact, signed her own name. The above occurred in 
the Seventh District Court, in and for San Juan County, Utah, Case No. 9717-71. 
Before Defendant could even be released, the State refiled in the same Court, 
Case No. 9717-90. The charges remained the same, but the language was changed to 
"did knowingly purchase or attempt to purchase goods or services by use of a financial 
transaction credit number not authorized by the issuer or cardholder." (R 1-2). 
Defendant filed a Motion to dismiss or Quash Bindover on June 23, 1997. (R 9) 
Defendant's Motion was denied. 
At trial the State introduced a tape recording of a phone conversation between 
Ms. Dimauro and her father, over Defendant's objection. (R 258) Defendant objected 
both because the recording had not been disclosed by the prosecution and the matter was 
not properly rebutted, Defendant having admitted previously that her relationship with her 
father "had deteriorated" (R 220), and having already admitted she had called her dad a 
"scum bag" and an "a-hole". (R 239) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The State is barred from filing a second case after its failure to obtain a 
bindover on its first case. 
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II. Allowing the tape recording to be presented to the jury after its 
nondisclosure was improper. The tape was not proper rebuttal. The tape is highly 
inflammatory and its sole purpose was to unfairly prejudice the jury. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I: The State is barred from filing a second case after its failure to obtain 
a bindover on its first case. 
The Utah Supreme Court has placed a limit on the State's ability to refile criminal 
charges when those charges have been previously dismissed. State v. Brickey. 714 P.2d 
644 (Utah 1986). in Brickey, the charges were originally dismissed for insufficient 
evidence, similar to Dimauro I, in which the charges were dismissed because the evidence 
was insufficient evidence to establish that she "signed the name of another." The Brickey 
rationale, as well as Brickey's progeny, clearly support Defendant's position. 
In Brickey, the Supreme Court first considered the purpose of a preliminary 
hearing, the standard of proof and the fact that jeopardy does not attach at the hearing. 
While the Court found that double jeopardy was therefore no bar to subsequent 
prosecution, it expressly held that the State is not therefore free to refile charges. In cases 
such as the present the Court adopted the Jones standard from Oklahoma, requiring the 
prosecutor to show new or previously unavailable evidence that has surfaced or other 
good cause before refiling. The court also set forth procedures for refiling which were not 
followed in Dimauro II. See also State v. Johnson, 782 P.2d 533 (Utah App 1989), State, 
v. Jaeger, 886 P.2d 53 (Utah 1994), discussing the strict requirements" of Brickey, at 55. 
Public policy consideration, as expressed in Brickey support defendant's position. 
The purpose of a preliminary hearing, as well as defendant's right to speedy trial, clearly 
guarantee defendants from unwarranted prosecution and protect his or her right to have 
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serious allegations disposed of efficiently and expeditiously. If the State has erred, the 
defendant should not be called upon to suffer. Nor should he or she be exposed to 
additional incarceration due to the State's error. The Court should note that dismissal 
does not leave the alleged victim remedieless, since they have the opportunity of 
civil remedy. 
Point II: The introduction of the tape recording was prejudicial to defendant 
In criminal prosecutions the state has two independent obligations to provide 
evidence to the defense. First, the state has a duty under the Due Process Clause of the 
United States Constitution to provide, without request by the Defendant all exculpatory 
evidence. State v. Worthen. 765 P.2d 839, 850 (Utah 1988); State v. Carter. 707 P.2d 
656, 662 (Utah 1985). Second, the state must disclose evidence pursuant to Rule 16 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
These duties have been determined to comply fully and forthrightly and to identify 
those portions not disclosed. State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913, 916-7 (Utah 1987). This 
obligation is ongoing and continuing. Brady v. Maryland. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
The KnighL case provides a thoughtful analysis of the need for criminal discovery 
to be a fair and full process to make sure that a trial is a real quest for truth and not simply 
a contest between the parties to win. KnighL at 917, citing £ad£i, further sets forth the 
standard of prejudice necessary for reversible error as reasonable likelihood of a different 
result Id. at 919. 
Defendant contends that the tape should not have been admitted on two bases. 
First, it was not proper rebuttal. Defendant had already admitted that the relationship with 
her father was bad. Second, the tapes were admitted, over objection, for their prejudicial 
rather than probative value. (R 258) The State acknowledged that the tapes were 
admitted to give the jury the "flavor" of the conversations and relationship with 
6 
defendant's father. 
The tape itself is inflammatory, including abusive and vulgar language. Since none 
of the probative points the State alleges it proved were at issue, its probative value was 
nil. It's sole function was to portray the defendant as unbelievable and to prejudice the 
jury against her. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant is entitled to a reversal of her conviction. 
DATED this * 1 day of February, 1998. 
LLIAMd^SOlULTZ WI I; 
Attorney for Appellant. 
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